US WITHDRAWAL AND POST 9/11 APPROACHES IN AFGHANISTAN

Abstract

Following the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan, the discussion centres on why the United States' longest and most costly military intervention in Afghanistan failed to defeat the Taliban and construct a lasting state. Various elements, both internal and external, are considered in this discussion, including US and Taliban strategies as well as regional and extra-regional actors' contributions to the conclusion of the Afghan conflict. Because of these flaws and inconsistencies, this study focuses on US plans for Afghanistan, including military force, political settlement, and state-building. It also reviews US efforts in Afghanistan under four administrations – from Bush to Biden – to see why these methods were ineffectual in dealing with the war in Afghanistan. The theoretical framework of Game Theory has been used to analyse these tactics. US strategies for entering Afghanistan were disconnected from the ground reality, according to this report, and thus accounted for the failure of the conflict's intended conclusion.